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Are we in command of our motor acts? The popular belief holds that our conscious
decisions are the direct causes of our actions. However, overwhelming evidence from
neurosciences demonstrates that our actions are instead largely driven by brain processes
that unfold outside of our consciousness. To study these brain processes, scientists have
used a range of different functional brain imaging techniques and experimental protocols,
such as subliminal priming. Here, we review recent advances in the field and propose a
theoretical model of motor control that may contribute to a better understanding of the
pathophysiology of movement disorders such as Parkinson’s disease.
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INTRODUCTION
In daily life, we usually have the feeling that we are the authors
of the actions we make, that the decisions we make and the cor-
responding movements we perform are consciously initiated and
controlled. The belief that our actions are caused by our men-
tal states, and these mental states are causally independent from
brain processes reflects a dualistic philosophy (Descartes, 1641).
However, the current scientific view holds that human actions and
mental states are both biologically determined and stem from pat-
terns of neural activity in the brain. Philosophers and scientists
have wondered for centuries about the extent of determinism in
our behavior. For example, Freud (1900) highlighted the impor-
tance of the unconscious on our wishes and acts. Even if the
Freudian unconscious seems today inconceivable, the concept of
cognitive unconscious is in the heart of the debates. That is the
reason why certain authors call into question the causal role of
consciousness in voluntary action (Libet et al., 1983) or even
the separation between automatic and controlled behavior, sug-
gesting that automatic and unconscious processes can form an
intrinsic part of all behaviors, even the most complex (Sumner
and Husain, 2008). Therefore, this review aims to summarize the
advances in understanding implicit mechanisms of motor deci-
sion and their underlying neural substrates by examining recent
research on motor awareness and subliminal priming. In addi-
tion to their philosophical ramifications, these findings also have
important clinical implications, and may help us better under-
stand and treat motor control disorders such as the Parkinson’s
disease (PD).
VOLUNTARY ACTION IS UNCONSCIOUSLY GENERATED
The idea that intention is a direct translation of desires and
goals into behavior is deeply embedded in our culture. But it is
supported by experimental evidence? That is the question which
interested Benjamin Libet 30 years ago (Libet et al., 1983). In his
pioneer experiment, participants were asked to make a volun-
tary movement at will and to report the exact time on a clock
at the instant they had decided to move, while their readiness
potential, a change in electroencephalography (EEG) activity over
the motor cortex that occurs prior to voluntary movement, was
being recorded. The results showed that the preparatory motor
activity began more than 350ms before subjects became aware
of the decision to act. More recently, Soon et al. (2008) used a
brain decoding statistical method to show that an action could be
predicted by blood-oxygen-level-dependent functional magnetic
resonance imaging (BOLD fMRI) signal. Although the volun-
teers felt they consciously decided to move, the vector machine
could classify the outcome of their decision by means of the activ-
ity in several cortical regions, such as the precuneus and the
fronto-polar cortex, up to a few seconds before the decision to
move entered awareness, while the activity in the supplemen-
tary motor area (SMA) determined the timing of that decision.
Others experiments have shown that a large fronto-parietal net-
work was involved in the conscious experience of decision to
make a voluntary movement (Lau et al., 2004; Sirigu et al.,
2004). This conscious experience of motor intention could be
influenced by efferent signals (i.e., premotor activity) and sen-
sory feedback signals (i.e., feedback from the movement itself)
(Obhi, 2007; Strother and Obhi, 2009). Brain stimulation tech-
niques have also brought us new insights into the brain processes
underlying the subjective experience of will. In 1969, Delgado
directly stimulated the internal capsule, inducing head turning
and body movements in the patient, which the patient experi-
enced as spontaneous and which he fought to control (Delgado,
1969). The arrival of transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS),
which is non-invasive, allowed scientists to modulate the brain
processes underlying the experience of voluntary control in large
samples of healthy subjects. For example, Brasil-Neto et al. (1992)
demonstrated that a choice between two alternatives could be bias
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by the stimulation of the motor cortex without disrupting the
conscious perception of volition. Taken together, these experi-
ments provide clear evidence suggesting that a voluntary action
might be initiated unconsciously and the movement selection
always precedes awareness while the intention feeling comes after-
ward (Wegner andWheatley, 1999; Hallett, 2007). According to
the model considering free will as a perception (Hallett, 2007),
intention does not cause our actions, but emerges as a con-
sequence of brain processes underlying movement preparation.
More specifically, a study by Desmurget et al. (2009) suggested
that motor intention was a consequence of increased parietal
cortex activity during motor preparation prior to motor execu-
tion. In their study, Desmurget et al. showed that stimulating
the posterior parietal cortex of patients could induce a strong
reportable intention and desire to move. This finding corrobo-
rates the neuroscientific view of biological determinism and is
also not contradictory with the idea that conscious will is an
illusion. Even if stimulating parietal cortex can create a motor
intention at a time t, it cannot be taken as a proof that it was
not preceded by an unconscious decision phase at a time t-1 (see
Figure 1).
Additional evidence of the importance of the unconscious cog-
nitive processes in voluntary motor action comes from research
employing subliminal priming, which suggests that a conscious
decision can be affected by stimuli that were never consciously
perceived. We review this evidence in the next section.
VOLUNTARY ACTION IS MODULATED BY SUBLIMINAL
STIMULI
In the 1970 s, researchers discovered that a patient with a primary
visual cortex lesion could continue to accurately differentiate
between two visual stimuli in a motor task despite not being able
to consciously perceive these stimuli (Weiskrantz et al., 1974).
This surprising phenomenon was termed “blindsight” and
FIGURE 1 | Time of voluntary initiation of action and the associated
brain regions. Frontal and parietal cortex work together for deciding the
action to plan and are also involved in the awareness of motor intention
whereas the SMA translates the first unconscious decision into movement.
The subjective experience of will comes from the awareness of intention
itself, the efferent signal from motor cortex to muscles and feedback
sensorial signals.
interpreted as evidence of a direct perceptuo-motor link which
allowed visual information to directly activate associated motor
responses, without any conscious awareness of this visual infor-
mation (Neumann, 1990). Experiments in healthy subjects con-
firmed this hypothesis. Indeed, Neumann and Klotz (1994)
showed that reaction time and accuracy of a target response could
be modulated by a subliminal prime, such that a prime compat-
ible with the response enhanced this response, whereas a prime
incompatible with the response impaired the response. This com-
patibility effect had also been reported when the relation between
the prime and the target was semantic (Dehaene et al., 1998).
The experiments reviewed above demonstrated that motor
actions can be influenced by external stimuli that are not con-
sciously perceived. However, these experiments do not allow
determining which processing level is reached by unconsciously
perceived stimuli. This issue was addressed by recording brain
activity changes in response to external stimuli that were not
consciously perceived. Dehaene et al. (1998) were among the
first to show that the effect of a subliminal visual stimulus on
brain activity could spread up to the level of brain areas involved
in motor response programming and execution. However, this
result in motor-related areas was not easy to interpret because
the subliminal stimuli were systematically followed by a motor
response. Many studies provided evidence supporting a direct
perceptuo-motor link for consciously perceived stimuli: simply
viewing an object can prime manual responses that might be
used to grasp the object, even when the person has no inten-
tion of making the associated movement (Tucker and Ellis, 1998;
Grezes and Decety, 2002; Derbyshire et al., 2006). Recently, our
group (D’Ostilio and Garraux, 2011), have reported new fMRI
evidence that such automatic and unconscious activity in motor-
related brain areas can be induced in a subliminal masked prime
task with no-response stimuli, when no movement is executed.
In this fMRI study, healthy volunteers performed a subliminal
masked prime task, in which they had to respond by pressing
a left or right button depending on the direction of the arrow
targets. In 40% of trials, a no-response target was displayed and
subjects were instructed to simply watch the middle of the screen
without making any response. A subliminal stimulus that could
be either an arrow (compatible or incompatible with the tar-
get) or a neutral stimulus (× sign) was presented on all trials.
fMRI analyses of these no-response trials revealed activation in
the medial premotor areas, including the SMA, when sublimi-
nal arrow stimuli were presented compared to neutral subliminal
stimuli.
The effect of external stimuli that are not consciously per-
ceived on voluntary motor action may also involve higher level
areas. By using subliminal priming paradigm, several new stud-
ies demonstrated that certain executive functions, such as task
switching, inhibition or error monitoring for example, could be
unconsciously modulated by certain brain regions traditionally
associated with conscious cognitive control (Lau and Passingham,
2007; Pavone et al., 2009; for a review see also Van Gaal et al.,
2008, 2010, 2012). In a recent experiment (D’Ostilio andGarraux,
2012), we corroborated this hypothesis by showing that sub-
liminal motor priming was underlain by activity changes in
frontal areas. Whereas unconscious facilitation was related to
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org September 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 265 | 2
D’Ostilio and Garraux Automatic and unconscious control of motor action
reduce activity in the motor-related areas, conflict induced by a
subliminal prime activated regions involved in high-level motor
control, traditionally linked to the cognitive system, such as the
anterior cingulate cortex and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.
As a corollary, these results call into question the traditional theo-
ries considering consciousness and cognitive control as being inti-
mately related, as well as the exclusive involvement of prefrontal
cortex in conscious processing of information.
As our behavior is flexible, the automatic activation of cor-
responding motor plans should be suppressed if the movement
is not intended to be immediately executed. In 1998, Eimer
and Schlaghecken provided evidence supporting the existence
of this inhibitory process by administering a specific sublimi-
nal masked prime task to a group of healthy subjects. For this
task, participants were asked to make speeded button presses
with the left or right hand following leftward or rightward point-
ing arrows, which were preceded by a subliminal masked prime
arrow. By manipulating the interstimulus interval (ISI), i.e., the
interval between the mask and the target (80ms<ISI<200), they
observed a Negative Compatibility Effect (NCE), namely a per-
formance cost for compatible trials (longer reaction times, more
errors) and a performance benefit for incompatible trials (shorter
reaction times, fewer errors). This effect was interpreted as an
index of the automaticmotor self-inhibitionmechanism that sup-
presses the partial motor activation caused by the prime. Indeed,
this self-inhibition produces a response conflict in the compati-
ble condition, subjects having more difficulties to answer to an
arrow which was beforehand suppressed. In the same study, this
reversal effect was validated by the EEG activity of motor cortex,
the Lateralized Readiness Potential (LRP), an electrophysiologi-
cal index of unimanual response preparation. The LRP revealed
an initial activation of the response corresponding to the prime
followed by a polarity shift, namely an activation of the oppo-
site response, reflecting the inhibition of the initial response
tendency (Eimer and Schlaghecken, 1998, 2003; Praamstra and
Seiss, 2005). According to Libet’s experiment, subliminal primes
also have the power to influence free choices between response
alternatives (Schlaghecken and Eimer, 2004; Kiesel et al., 2006),
suggesting again that the initiation of a voluntary action relies on
unconscious processes.
The model proposed by Eimer and Schlaghecken (2003) has
generated a series of experiments aimed at identifying the neural
correlates of the automatic and unconscious inhibition especially
by using a lesional approach. Sumner et al. (2007) suggested a
key role of the medial frontal cortex in the automatic suppres-
sion of unwantedmotor plans. They administrated the subliminal
masked prime task to two patients with small lesions of the SMA
or the supplementary eye field (SEF). These patients produced
opposite-to-normal effects, namely a facilitation effect instead of
inhibition and this occurred in an effector-specific manner mir-
roring the extent of the patients’ damage. Sub-cortical regions
were also associated with these automatic and unconscious pro-
cesses, notably the basal ganglia and thalamus (Aron et al., 2003).
Aron et al. (2003) administered the subliminal masked prime
task to 15 patients with genetically-confirmed Huntington’s dis-
ease, a progressive neurodegenerative disease characterized by
nerve cell loss in the striatum, leading to chorea, a hyperkinetic
movement disorder. Both controls and patients showed a NCE
of equal magnitude. According to chorea severity, the researchers
observed a bimodal distribution, namely an absence of NCE in
patients with greater chorea and a stronger NCE than controls
in patients with less chorea. In the same study, the authors also
used fMRI as healthy volunteers performed the same task and
found activity changes in the caudate and thalamus for the inhi-
bition condition, an observation that is in agreement with their
findings in Huntington patients. This pattern of brain regions
involved can lead us to rethink some motor control diseases as
an impairment of theses automatic and unconscious primary
processes.
A NEW LOOK ON MOTOR CONTROL DISORDERS
FRONTAL PATIENTS
Several disorders of motor control are related to disturbances in
fronto-striatal circuits that may result from an impairment of
automatic and unconscious processes such as motor activation
and inhibition. For instance, the alien hand syndrome, often char-
acterized by unwanted movements that arise without any sense of
volition, with the patient feeling that his or her hand does not
belong to them. The affected hand can grasp a nearby object and
have difficulties to release it or even violently throw it. This syn-
drome is often linked with a damage to the medial frontal lobe or
the corpus callosum (Gasquoine, 1993; Kertesz and McMonagle,
2010). The fact that some patients think they do not have the
intention to cause the action they make and inversely that a
brain stimulation of a movement can produce a feeling of will or
that the brain of choreic Huntington’s disease patient sometimes
interprets the involuntarymovements as being voluntary (Hallett,
2007), provide examples supporting the view of an unconscious
causation of action. Furthermore, this dissociation between the
conscious decision to act and the action itself is in line with the
idea that an inhibitory control could be triggered unconsciously.
Thus, in those patients, an internal or environmental stimulation
could produce a representation and an activation of the associated
movement but could not be automatically suppressed, even when
the action must not be performed. The impairment of these pri-
mary mechanisms could also explain the disinhibition problem
of utilization behavior, a related syndrome in which the patient
could reach out and automatically use objects in his environment,
the act being often inappropriate to the context, like picking up a
toothbrush and brushing his teeth in response to a toothbrush
being placed in front of him, even if he is in a friend’s house
(Archibald et al., 2001).
BASAL GANGLIA DISORDERS
Basal ganglia circuits are sites of interaction between motor,
cognitive, and limbic systems that play an important role in the
control of movement planning and execution, notably in initiat-
ing, inhibiting, and switching behaviors, as well as in the process-
ing of reward and other feedback (Aron et al., 2009). The study of
PD, a progressive neurodegenerative basal ganglia disorder char-
acterized by hypokinetic motor symptoms such as akinesia, offers
a unique opportunity to study the automatic and unconscious
processes which modulate action control. For that purpose, Seiss
and Praamstra (2004) administrated the masked prime task to PD
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patients on their usual dopaminergic medications and showed
a delay in the NCE although the overall response time course
was normal (Seiss and Praamstra, 2006), suggesting that a part
of automatic motor processes are probably preserved in PD.
Furthermore, the motor control impairment in PD is interest-
ing because of their kinesia paradoxica. For example, akinetic
patients in instances of emergency may be able to make quick
movements such as suddenly running. This can suggest that
patients with PD have intact motor programmes but are usu-
ally unable to recruit them adequately (Jankovic, 2008). Mazzoni
et al. (2007) proposed that the slowness of movement in PD
may be attributable to the poor motor motivation caused by a
shift in the cost/benefit ratio of moving fast, as a result of loss
of dopamine, this neurotransmitter being also linked to reward
mechanisms (de la Fuente-Fernandez et al., 2002). Thus, we can
hypothesize that the automatic and unconscious motor activa-
tion/inhibition processes are dependent on the dopamine circuit,
and so of themotivation to realize a given action. According to the
proposedmodel, the system normally chooses to suppress an acti-
vated movement, if and only if this movement is not reinforced
within 100–200ms, whereas if a valuable stimulus is presented to
the system, the initiated movement is executed. The existence of
an unconscious motivation system was underlined by Pessiglione
et al. (2007) who demonstrated, by using an incentive force task
with money as a subliminal reward, that even when participants
could not report the amount of money at stake, they deployed
a greater force for high reward. In addition, they localized this
subliminal reward expectation system in basal ganglia, more pre-
cisely in the ventral pallidum. Furthermore, Schmidt et al. (2008)
reported that patients with bilateral striato-pallidal lesion failed to
integrate the affective value of reward into their motor behavior.
Taken together, this research can help us to reinterpret basal gan-
glia motor disorders like PD, as an unbalance between automatic
activation and inhibition processes, monitored by a basal ganglia
motor motivation system.
CONCLUSIONS
Although many theoretical models have been developed to
explain aspects of motor control, the mechanistic basis of motor
control remains incompletely understood. In this review, we
attempted to review recent research on the role of automatic
and unconscious processes in the voluntary control of motor
action. We first focused on the role of unconsciousness in action
preparation, suggesting that the feeling of motor intention comes
afterward without directly causing behavior. Next, we reviewed
growing evidence that unconscious and automatic processes play
an important role in both activation and inhibition of motor
behaviors. Such processes could be present in all behavior and
could be specially revealed by brain-lesioned patients who man-
ifest difficulties controlling the actions they intend or do not
intend to execute. In addition, we introduce a new hypothesis
which may explain the diversity of motor control diseases, namely
an unbalance between the primary self-activation, self-inhibition
mechanisms, and the unconscious motivation to act.
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